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INEQUALITY AND MOBILITY ANALYSIS
BY THE HUNGARIAN ROTATION PANEL, 1993-98
Abstract
We investigate the trends of inequalities and mobility of income, expendi-
ture and  stock of durables between 1993 and 1998 in Hungary. In 1996-8
the stagnating level of inequalities is coupled with relatively low and de-
creasing mobility. The relationship between inequalities and mobility fas-
tens the relative positions of households, increasing the share of house-
holds unable to improve their positions on the short term. The impacts of
the stabilisation shock in 1995 are shown with the help of the Hungarian
Rotation Household Panel, a new dataset based on Household Budget
Surveys. We give a detailed description of the Rotation Panel.
KAPITÁNY ZSUZSA – MOLNÁR GYÖRGY
EGYENLŐTLENSÉG ÉS MOBILITÁS ELEMZÉS A MAGYAR ROTÁCIÓS
HÁZTARTÁS PANEL SEGÍTSÉGÉVEL, 1993-1998
Kivonat
Tanulmányunk a magyar háztartások jövedelmeinek, kiadásainak, valamint
tartós fogyasztási cikkekkel való ellátottságának egyenlőtlenségeit és mo-
bilitását vizsgálja 1993 és 1998 között. A kutatást megelőző elemzések egy-
behangzóan arra az eredményre jutottak, hogy a kilencvenes évek elején,
Magyarországon növekedtek a jövedelmi egyenlőtlenségek. Számításaink
azt mutatják, hogy a kilencvenes évek második felére ez a növekedés
megállt. Az 1996-8-as időszakban az egyenlőtlenségek stagnáló szintje re-
latíve alacsony és csökkenő mobilitással párosult. Az egyenlőtlenségek és a
mobilitás között fennálló kapcsolat rögzíti a háztartások relatív pozícióit,
növelve azon háztartások arányát, akik rövidtávon nem képesek pozícióikat
javítani. Kutatásunk során olyan eszköztár létrehozására törekedtünk,
melynek segítségével az 1995-ben végrehajtott stabilizációs program hatása
és az erre adott fogyasztói reakciók is elemezhetőek. Vizsgálatainkat a KSH
Háztartási Költségvetési Felvétele alapján általunk létrehozott Magyar
Rotációs Háztartás Panel felhasználásával végeztük.5
INTRODUCTION
The studies analysing the income and expenditure pattern of Eastern and
Central European households in the early 1990s revealed that the inequali-
ties had increased while the mobility of income and expenditure had also
grown. The relative income and expenditure position of the households was
changing quite rapidly.
1
One of the fundamental questions our research aimed to answer was how
these processes developed during the later period of the transition in Hun-
gary; whether or not the relatively high mobility in the early phase of the
transition slowed down and, if so, how the range and the trend of inequali-
ties have been shaped. Moreover, the changes in inequalities and mobility
were accompanied by a marked decrease in the total income and expenditure
of the households.
We experience every day that people find it hard to get over a situation
when they feel that their neighbours move past them in the income and even
more so on the consumption hierarchy. In an expanding economy, where
growth is an accessible aim for most households, the problem arises more
bluntly from the point of view of social mood. However, in an economy
shrinking for a longer period, growth, even if ever so small, becomes a neu-
ralgic point. The issue of relative mobility is made particularly acute in the
Hungary of the 90s by the fact that the average household saw their real in-
comes significantly reducing.
The studies analysing the income and the expenditure of households in
Hungary during the 1990s relied on two large, comprehensive databases: the
household statistics of the Central Statistical Office (CSO), and the Hun-
garian Household Panel (HHP) survey of TÁRKI. Many studies and articles
used TÁRKI’s HHP database.
2 Although the database and partly the re-
search tools of our study differs from theirs, our conceptual apparatus is
similar. Probably due to its not being a panel, the database of CSO’s House-
                                                
1 See the comprehensive works of Atkinson and Micklewright (1992) and Milanovic
(1998, 1999).
2 Förster, Szívós and Tóth (1999), Galasi (1998), Habich and Spéder (1999), Heinrich
(1999), Lokshin and Ravallion (2000), Medgyesi, Szívós and Tóth (2000), Rutkowski
(2001), Sik and Tóth (1997), Spéder (1998), Tóth, Andorka, Förster and Spéder
(1994).6
hold Budget Survey (HBS) was less frequently used for measuring income
inequalities and for tracking their changes in time.
3
TÁRKI’s HHP study focusing primarily on gathering income data was
closed in 1997. Since that time no panel data of the Hungarian households
have been collected. Hence the primary aim of our work was to establish a
panel database for the period between 1993-5 and 1996-8 on the bases of
CSO HBS
4. We named our database Hungarian Rotation Household Panel
(hereinafter: Rotation Panel) referring to the method of its creation.
The results of the analyses carried out prior to our research unanimously
showed that the income inequalities had increased during the first period of
the transition in the early 1990s. According to TÁRKI studies
5, after a stag-
nation and slight increase in the middle of the decade, income inequalities
grew significantly again from 1996. However, the calculations using the
Rotation Panel did not support these findings.
As the 1995 stabilisation program took place in the middle of the period un-
der review, we intended to create a set of tools to enable us to analyse and
accurately describe the impacts of such short term but drastic phenomena as
a stabilisation program. That is why, focusing on Hungary, we examined the
inequalities and mobility together, analysing the development of the mobil-
ity in a way that is somewhat different from the usual approach by modify-
ing the method of transition matrices. Another new element of our approach
is that we investigated inequalities and mobility also for the stock of dur-
ables.
The studies analysing inequalities and mobility generally pay more attention
to the income side and less or no attention to expenditures. We aimed to
strike a balance between the two sides, an effort to which the database pro-
vided excellent conditions.
In Section 1 we give a brief account of the relevant macroeconomic trends
of the 1990s. That is followed by a short introduction to the database in
Section 2. A more detailed description of data generation methods and ma-
jor characteristics is included in the Appendix.
In Section 3, we have examined the tendencies of income and expenditure
inequalities in the light of different inequality measures. We also present the
decomposition of the expenditure inequalities by major expenditure groups.
Section 4 discusses the changes in time of the mobility/immobility as well as
the relationship between inequalities and mobility. The last section gives an
                                                
3 Collins and Redmond (1997), Kattuman and Redmond (1997, 2001), Pudney (1994),
Redmond and Kattuman (2001).
4 On the panels between 1993-95, see Kapitány, Keszthelyiné Rédei and Molnár (1999).
5 See Medgyesi, Szívós and Tóth (2000).7
analysis of the inequalities and mobility of the household durables using the
scoring system that we have developed. The study closes with the summary
of our major conclusions.
1. MACROECONOMIC PROCESSES IN HUNGARY IN THE 90S
If we accept the GDP as the most comprehensive statistical indicator of
growth, then it will suggest hardly any growth in the decade of 1990. In
1999 the GDP still fell short of that in 1989 (see table 1). Employment in
the 90s dropped significantly, by more than one quarter, while the popula-
tion shrank only by as little as 3%. In 1999 there were one million less em-
ployees producing a GDP equal to that in 1989.
Taking account also of the fact that important qualitative changes occurred
in the structure of GDP output and utilisation, one can state that in the back-
ground of the average stagnation of the 90s there were truly drastic and fast
economic changes. These processes had a strong impact on the income con-
ditions and reshuffled the consumption structure of the households.
The 90s fall into three stages in accordance with the timing of GDP trends.
The first stage lasted from 1990 to 1993, witnessing four years of shocking
decline. The second period, from 1994 to 1996, was characterised by the
halting of the downward trend, and the beginning of a gentle upswing. The
fall of the GDP was not accompanied by a similar decrease in real incomes,
that is why the deficit of the budget and of the foreign balance of payments
reached a critical level. This led to the introduction of an austerity package
in March 1995, which meant to restore the equilibrium of the Hungarian
economy. Partly as a result of the stabilisation measures, the third period
after 1997 saw a dynamic GDP growth averaging just below 5% annually.
Employment dropped dramatically until 1993, and kept reducing until 1997
at a low rate. From 1997 onward even the employment rose somewhat, but
at a lower rate than the GDP. However, the share of the registered unem-
ployed within the economically active population only grew until 1993 to
reach a rate of 13%, and to drop to 9.3% by 1999. Part of the unemployed
population were not registered as they resorted into disability pension or
‘decided’ to stay in the household.
The decline of the real incomes more or less followed that of the GDP,
while real wages reduced more drastically. Household consumption, how-
ever, moved along a different curve than the GDP. The major setback in
consumption in 1990 and 1991 was followed by stagnation and a moderate
rise in 1992-94. Especially expenditure on durable consumers’ goods grew8
in those years. The austerity measures translated into a second and likewise
significant drop in household consumption levels in 1995 and 1996.
Table 1



















1989 100 100 100 100 100 100
1990 97 129 97 97 98 95
1991 85 174 90 90 96 86
1992 82 214 81 89 93 86
1993 82 262 76 85 88 88
1994 84 311 75 91 91 88
1995 85 399 73 80 87 82
1996 87 493 73 76 87 80
1997 91 583 73 80 88 82
1998 95 667 74 83 91 86
1999 99 734 76 85 92 90
Source: KSH (2001)
The sudden surge of the consumers’ price index early in the 90s came in the
wake of price liberalisation, while abating inflation between 1992 and 1994
already reflects a more peaceful stage following the initial shock of the tran-
sition period (see table 2). From 1992 to 1994 the rate of inflation of dur-
ables was much lower than the general rate of inflation. Price increases of
food (until 1995) and price increases of household energy (until 1998) were
significantly above the average. The repeated and drastic rise of the average
consumer price index in 1995 was the result of the stabilisation program.
In terms of households’ real income tendencies 1994 and 1995 may be re-
garded as turning points. While in 1994 the per capita real income and the
real wage index, and the real value of the average pension rose, in 1995
these same indicators suggested the substantial reduction of incomes. This is
how, as regards household incomes and household consumption, the year
1995, following a crisis period of over a decade, is a real low, yielding to
only a gentle rise in the second part of the 90s.9
Table 2
Consumer price indices by main commodity groups












1989 118 111 124 118 117
1990 135 128 127 121 129
1991 122 181 149 132 135
1992 119 143 111 114 123
1993 129 120 112 111 123
1994 123 112 111 112 119
1995 131 150 132 124 128
1996 117 133 115 119 124
1997 118 130 103 109 118
1998 114 118 107 108 114
1999 103 109 104 107 110
Source: KSH (2002)
2. A SHORT PRESENTATION OF THE ROTATION PANEL
The Household Budget Survey conducted annually by the Central Statistical
Office since 1993 is based partly on monthly household records, and partly
on post-facto annual interviews, and contains very detailed information on
expenditures
6. One third of the households rotate annually, thus about one
third/quarter of households spend 3 years in the survey.
There have been serious attempts at extracting a panel from the HBS and
analysing it, using the HBS data generated in the late 80s as well as in the
early 90s
7. From 1993 it has been possible to extract, from the HBS survey
data, the panel database never used previously as no serious structural
changes took place during that period in the surveying system.
Between 1995 and 1996 unfortunately the entire sample was replaced, and
so in 1996 a new panel cycle began. The 1993-95 panel contains 3,507
households, and the 1996-98 one 1,863.
                                                
6 A detailed description of the full database is contained in the Appendix.
7 van de Walle, Ravallion and Gautam (1994), Révész (1994).10
The panel played up, if to a small extent, some of the unfavourable features
of the HBS sample. The most important ones of these are as follows:
–  young adults are significantly underrepresented;
–  unemployed persons and pensioners are overrepresented, while active
earners and especially entrepreneurs are underrepresented;
–  Budapest is underrepresented significantly, and larger cities to a lesser
extent;
–  higher education graduates are underrepresented.
In order to restore representativity according to age, gender, activity status,
schooling, and region of residence we have employed the method of gener-
alised iterative scaling
8 to weight (calibrate) our data, using design-based
weights as initial values. The weights generated apply uniformly to each
member of a particular household.
No weighting will ever solve the basic sampling problem of the HBS,
namely that the poorest (e.g. homeless, functional illiterate persons) with
whom the interviewers could not create contact are missing from the sam-
ple. Also missing are the most affluent who often live in separation from so-
ciety, and refuse to disclose information to the survey.
Without weighting the per capita average income of Rotation Panel house-
holds falls a few percentages short of the average sample computed on the
basis of the full HBS sample. By applying the panel-weighing obtained from
the calibration process we have managed to compensate the discrepancies
between the panel and the original HBS sample as well as some of the in-
consistencies resulting from the changes year on year in sampling method
and weighting of the HBS.
Throughout the study we have used the net incomes of households, deduct-
ing the income tax and the social security contributions. The income in-
cludes consumption of self-produced food along with the net farm revenues.
In addition to usual items, we also regard as income part of the cash reve-
nues not accounted for as income by CSO classification, more specifically
revenue derived from sales of movable or immovable property, taking
housing subsidy granted after children, sales of restitution vouchers, and of
property received as gift. This helps us avoid the appearance of negative in-
comes in the database.
By household expenditure we mean expenditure on consumption goods in-
cluding consumption of self-produced food. Expenditures do not, conse-
quently, include non-personal expenditures.
In the practice we must treat with reservations the theoretical statement that
the difference of incomes and expenditures yields savings (positive or
                                                
8 See Darroch and Ratcliff (1972)11
negative). In addition to forgetfulness, errors, or tax-evading attitudes of
entrepreneurs, and the extrapolation of part of the annual expenditures (first
of all food) from monthly data, we must mention two distorting factors.
The survey does not at all inquire about savings, and even interest and divi-
dends are only indicated if a household collects it in cash. The other such
factor is small ‘family based’ partnerships, including those founded chiefly
with tax evasion purposes, whose incomes and expenditures are inconsis-
tently separated from household incomes and expenditures. It often happens
that the respondent is not sufficiently consistent, and evades their incomes
and expenditures in a ‘lopsided’ fashion, i.e. they indicate items purchased
from the partnership’s funds but used for the purposes of the household as a
household expense, but fail to take account of the related income.
We have circumstantial evidence for the above phenomenon through com-
paring the original sample and the panel. We have mentioned previously
that those in the top income and expenditure decile fall out of scope of the
panel at a higher-than-average rate. Also, those in the first income decile are
likewise underrepresented in the panel, while the same fails to hold true for
those in the bottom expenditure decile as there is hardly anyone in the panel
from the 1
st income decile whose expenditures much exceed their incomes.
Entrepreneurs constitute an extreme case of this. Entrepreneurs in the first
income decile share the first six deciles in terms of expenditure, while half
of the entrepreneurs not in the panel, belonging to the first income decile are
members of an expenditure group higher than this.
Is seems clear that those who conceal their incomes but do not manage to
bring their expenditure records in line with it, or fail at properly timing their
household incomes and expenditures with those of their partnership, and re-
alise their error at year end, on consolidating their books, will decline their
participation in the survey next year. This results in a smaller discrepancy
between households’ income and expenditure positions in the panel than in
the entire sample.
We conclude the description of the Rotation Panel by a comparison with
macro-data. The Rotation Panel registers a much greater drop of per capita
real income and consumption than macro-data (see table 3). By way of
comparison, we present also the results of computations by TÁRKI’s Hun-
garian Household Panel. True, there is some slip of time between the
Household Panel and the Rotation Panel
9, yet, the two household surveys re-
flect a basically similar picture, discrepant from the macro-data.
                                                
9 The reason of this slip may be the fact that the survey of the Rotation Panel is based on
calendar years, while the HHP’s on the period April to March next year.12
Table 3
Per capita real income and consumption – a comparison (1993=100)
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Income
CSO macrodata
1 100 103 98 98 99 103
Rotation Panel 100 99 89 80 79 82
HHP
2 100 92 86 77
Consumption
CSO macrodata
 1 100 100 94 91 93 98





The reason for the discrepancy is the notional and methodological differ-
ence between the National Accounts and the household surveys. The differ-
ences are truly significant not only in terms of tendencies but also in abso-
lute values as the National Accounts reflect two times the Rotation Panel
data in incomes, and 1.5 times in consumption.
The largest discrepancy is seen in owners’ incomes. Bank interests and
dividends increased dynamically over the years under scrutiny, from which
household data only took note of sums collected in cash. This is also where
the phenomena discussed above in conjunction with entrepreneurs’ incomes
belong. Upon preparing the National Accounts, entrepreneurs’ incomes are
taken into account using Tax Office data and experts’ estimates.
The National Accounts take into consideration the ‘speculative’ rent of ten-
ants’ own flats, a sum rising considerably in the wake of the housing priva-
tisation process in progress during the period in question. This is ignored
when preparing the HBS, and we find that this is good practice.
We will not touch upon differences of methodology with a smaller effect on
discrepancies between tendencies. We are of the opinion that if we disregard
the group of entrepreneurs in the top income bracket, household surveys
provide an accurate picture.13
3. INEQUALITIES IN INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
Many investigations focused on earning inequalities in Hungary over the
last years, or, in a wider context, on income inequalities of Hungarian
households.
10  Kattuman  and  Redmond (2001) investigated the non-panel
HBS data to examine income inequality in Hungary between 1987 and
1996. Their analysis showed a sharp increase in income inequality between
1991 and 1993, followed by a little growth between 1993 and 1996.
A paper by Medgyesi, Szívós and Tóth (2000) publishes a time series of Gini
coefficients embracing the whole of the period under our investigation.
Their data are computed with reference to the period 1991/2 and 1996/7 on
the basis of the surveys of the HHP, then on the basis of two TÁRKI Hun-
garian Household Monitor surveys separate from each other and from the
panel. Their results suggest that the Gini coefficient of equalised income
11
rose from 0.278 to 0.316 between 1992/93 and 1994/95, then stagnated at
0.309 for two years. Following that period, the Gini coefficient began to
move upward again to reach 0.320 in 1997/98, and 0.343 in 1998/99.
The inequality computations with the Rotation Panel for 1993-6 give results
very similar to Kattuman and Redmond (2001), however – mainly for 1997-
8 – yield results that differ from that of Medgyesi, Szívós and Tóth (2000) in
many respects.
Table 4 shows different inequality measures. Unless otherwise (‘per cap-
ita’) indicated, we have used indices computed on the basis of equalised in-
come or expenditure. P90/P10 stands for the ratio of percentile 90 and 10 of
the relevant parameter, GE(-1) and GE(2) are the values of the Generalised
Entropy inequality index at parameters -1 and 2.
12 GE(2) is half of the
square of the coefficient of variation. The GE(2) is relatively sensitive to
differences appearing at the top of the distribution under investigation, and
GE(-1) to those appearing at the bottom of the same, while the Gini coeffi-
cient is sensitive primarily around the mode of the distribution. In the case
of some inequality measures we present bias corrected confidence intervals
on 95% significance level obtained by bootstrapping.
13
                                                
10 E.g. Galasi (1998), Heinrich (1999), Milanovic (1999), Pudney (1994), Spéder
(1998), Redmond and Kattuman (2001).
11 The income of the household is divided by a size-equivalent, in this particular case by
S
0.73 where S stands for the household size. In what follows, we are going to apply
the same solution when referring to equalised income or equalised expenditure.
12 On the Generalised Entropy index, and its use in decomposition by factors and
population groups, see e.g. Shorrocks (1982, 1984), Jenkins (1995).
13 On the bootstrap method see e.g. Efron–Tibshirani (1993).14
The Gini coefficients computed from the Rotation Panel are lower all
along the line than those obtained from the HHP. This difference can be
explained by the fact that the HHP contains a relatively larger number of
high-income households than the HBS.
Table 4
Income inequalities on the basis of the Rotation Panel
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
P90/P10 per capita 2.58 2.66 2.83 2.94 2.86 2.94
   Conf. interval 2.49- 2.70 2.57-2.75 2.74-2.94 2.78-3.07 2.77-2.96 2.82-3.15
P90/P10 2.44 2.54 2.60 2.63 2.60 2.67
   Conf. interval 2.34- 2.55 2.48-2.58 2.48-2.72 2.51-2.75 2.50-2.71 2.58-2.79
P90/P50 1.63 1.61 1.62 1.63 1.63 1.64
P50/P10 1.49 1.58 1.61 1.62 1.60 1.62
P75/P25 1.61 1.63 1.61 1.64 1.58 1.60
Gini per capita 0.234 0.218 0.238 0.247 0.229 0.242
   Conf. interval 0.223-0.246 0.211-0.226 0.225-0.253 0.233-0.260 0.221-0.239 0.231-0.254
Gini 0.222 0.208 0.225 0.227 0.211 0.223
   Conf. interval 0.213-0.233 0.205-0.214 0.215-0.228 0.221-0.235 0.199-0.216 0.216-0.235
GE(-1) 0.087 0.076 0.089 0.091 0.076 0.090
GE(2) 0.115 0.086 0.116 0.109 0.083 0.101
P90/P10 modified* 2.40 2.31 2.42 2.44 2.40 2.48
Gini on earnings** 0.371 0.376 0.391 0.394 0.400 0.409
*   Without long-term unemployed persons family.
** Gini coefficient of those households that receive income from earnings, only taking
account of this type of income. Earnings in the broad sense includes income from an
enterprise, but excludes the net yield of agricultural activities.
The level of the per capita inequality indicators slightly exceeds the values
for the equalised income. This is primarily explained by the fact that there
are relatively many large families among the poorest groups of society
where calculations based on equalised income paints a nicer picture. How-
ever, there is no difference between the changes in time using the two ap-
proaches.
The P90/P10 index shows a slow but steady growth between 1993 and
1996 followed by stagnation from 1996 to 1998. Confidence intervals un-
ambiguously indicate that the increase is significant while the inequality
fluctuation from 1996 to 1998 is not, therefore stagnation is certainly the
right term to use. The rise of inequalities indicated by the P90/P10 index is15
basically ascribable to the increasing social detachment of the poor in the
period 1993-6, well indicated by the rise of the P50/P10 quotient while the
P90/P50 and the P75/P25 figures kept level all through the period.
The last but one line of table 4 corroborates our statement. When generat-
ing it, we removed from the sample all households in which there was
someone unemployed in each of the three years under scrutiny, i.e. house-
holds hit by long-term unemployment. In 1993-95 3.3% of households, and
4.5% of persons belonged to this group. The corresponding data in 1996-
98 are 3.5 and 5.1% respectively. The table suggests that the P90/P10 ratio
calculated ignoring the foregoing reflects no rising tendency whatsoever.
The growth of the ratio of percentiles 90 and 10 in the period 1993-6 is
clearly indicative of the increasing detachment of households struggling
with long-term unemployment.
The Gini coefficient significantly reduced between 1993 and 1994, to
swing upward again until 1996. The range of inequality remains virtually
unchanged from 1996 to 1998 with a temporary drop in 1997. The GE(-1)
indicator also reflects the rise of inequality between 1994 and 1996. In the
case of the GE(2) we find diminishing inequality in the middle of both
three-year periods, yet, on the whole, what we really see is stagnating ine-
quality. In this respect there is a difference between the results of Kattu-
man and Redmond (2001) and ours, because they calculated a moderately
increasing GE(2) measure between 1993 and 1996. The GE(2) indicator, as
it is, responds quite sensitively if in higher income brackets only a few
households experience a larger change of income.
In an attempt to explain the fluctuation of inequality, the essential point
comes up in the last line of table 4. This unambiguously indicates that ine-
quality of wages follows an unbroken upward curve throughout the entire
period, but more intensively in its first half. During the investigated period
this inequality was more or less equalised by different kinds of social
transfers. The process showed by Kattuman and Redmond (2001) and Rut-
kowski (2001) was continued after 1996.
The stabilisation package in early 1995 went hand in hand with the reduc-
tion of the real value of various social transfers, primarily through infla-
tion. That is why rising wage inequalities between 1994 and 1996 appears
in the inequality of households’ incomes without the counter-effect of
other factors.
With the successful conclusion of the stability measures, 1997 saw the
economy back on track, and pensions rose again in real value, while the
real value of earnings in the broad sense still dropped by nearly 5% in the
panel. Also the temporary reduction of inequality resulted from the in-16
crease of personal social incomes other than pension. As our time series
does not continue for the time being, we are not in a position to know if
growth in 1998, evident in all indicators is the manifestation of a new pe-
riod of growing inequality or only of the fluctuation between 1996-98.
The analyses carried out with the Rotation Panel indicate that the situa-
tion changed substantially following the initial years of the transition. In
1996-8 the income inequalities of Hungarian households stabilised rather
than further rising. The gentle rise and the subsequent stabilisation of ine-
quality took place besides a major and universal shrinking of real incomes
and real expenditures.
This stabilisation of income inequalities differs from the results of TÁRKI
referred to early in this section. As the temporal changes of the indicators
obtained from the Rotation Panel and the HHP in the period 1993-6 show a
very similar picture, the possibility may present itself that growth of the
inequality following 1996 apparent from TÁRKI’s data stems from the
mere fact that their new samples are independent from their earlier panel.
Expenditure inequalities indicated in table 5 exceed income inequalities
according to every inequality measure.
Table 5
Expenditure inequalities based on the Rotation Panel
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
P90/P10 per capita 3.11 3.13 3.11 3.36 3.23 3.18
   Conf. interval 3.05-3.27 3.01-3.25 3.01-3.22 3.22-3.51 3.05-3.40 3.05-3.33
P90/P10 2.89 2.92 2.93 3.01 2.90 2.90
   Conf. interval 2.81-2.99 2.85 -3.01 2.79-3.05 2.84-3.17 2.76-3.12 2.73-3.01
P90/P50 1.72 1.72 1.70 1.80 1.76 1.76
P50/P10 1.68 1.70 1.73 1.67 1.65 1.64
P75/P25 1.77 1.72 1.72 1.76 1.68 1.76
Gini per capita 0.261 0.258 0.261 0.283 0.269 0.268
   Conf. interval 0.252-0.273 0.248-0.271 0.254-0.269 0.269-0.298 0.258-0.282 0.258-0.281
Gini 0.247 0.245 0.249 0.266 0.251 0.247
   Conf. interval 0.240-0.256 0.236-0.255 0.241-0.256 0.254-0.279 0.240-0.263 0.238-0.258
GE(-1) 0.105 0.105 0.110 0.122 0.110 0.107
GE(2) 0.135 0.129 0.129 0.170 0.132 0.124
As for expenditure, we witness an unchanged degree of inequality with a
single and significant upsurge limited to 1996. This sudden growth of ex-
penditure inequality, and its subsequent return to its original range, closely17
related to the stabilisation process in 1995, definitely calls for a more de-
tailed explanation. Before we proceed, however, let us present the way in
which the structure of household expenditure in a breakdown according to
major expenditure groups progressed in the period in question (table 6).
Table 6
Distribution of expenditure by major expenditure groups
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Food 34.1 34.7 35.4 33.4 33.5 33.4
Tobacco/alcohol/coffee 6.0 6.2 5.8 6.0 5.4 5.5
Clothing 7.9 7.3 6.3 6.3 5.9 5.9
Housing maintenance 14.1 14.0 16.0 16.9 18.9 19.1
Housing accessories 5.8 5.4 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.3
Health/fitness/cosmetics 3.6 3.8 4.2 4.9 4.7 4.6
Transports/ telecommunication 12.7 13.3 12.6 12.5 13.3 13.2
Culture/entertainment 6.2 6.3 6.0 6.5 5.7 6.4
Housing construction and
real estate purchase 6.6 6.0 5.5 5.0 3.9 2.3
Other expenditures 3.0 3.0 3.4 3.4 3.7 4.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
of this: durable goods 5.9 5.9 4.9 3.7 3.8 4.4
One only experiences a clear and unbroken tendency in the case of a few
expenditure groups. The weight of housing maintenance expenditures was
steadily growing, explained chiefly by the rise of household energy far ex-
ceeding average inflation (see table 2). Expenditure on housing construc-
tion/real estate purchases continuously decreased especially in the second
part of the period under scrutiny, and in 1996-97 the share of expenditure on
durable goods likewise shrank. Also declining is the tendency of clothing
expenditures. Even though aggregate incomes and expenditures reduced
until 1997, the share of expenditure on food only rises until 1995, and sta-
bilises at a lower level thereafter.
Returning to the investigation of expenditure inequality, table 7 shows the
progress of the GE(2) inequality index for expenditure groups, and table 8
shows the relative weight of these groups in shaping the value of GE(2) for
total expenditure.
14 In generating the data in table 8, the correlation be-
tween total expenditures and expenditures on individual product groups
                                                
14 In our computations we took advantage of Stephen P. Jenkins' programs available in
the Stata Technical Bulletin.18




Inequality of equalised expenditure by expenditure groups,
 on the basis of the GE(2) index
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Food 0.084 0.094 0.089 0.141 0.090 0.085
Tobacco/alcohol/coffee 0.394 0.372 0.371 0.545 0.404 0.449
Clothing 0.592 0.556 0.608 0.669 0.681 0.680
Housing maintenance 0.112 0.120 0.111 0.120 0.107 0.110
Housing accessories 0.908 0.886 1.146 0.863 0.975 1.527
Health/fitness/cosmetics 0.598 0.762 0.754 0.959 1.282 2.155
Transports/telecommunication 1.542 1.855 1.638 0.984 1.075 0.999
Culture/entertainment 0.762 0.730 1.207 1.110 1.071 1.042
Housing construction/real
estate purchase 5.592 4.726 8.359 9.381 7.610 4.945
Other expenditures 2.364 2.866 2.660 2.086 3.252 2.709
Total 0.135 0.129 0.129 0.170 0.132 0.125
   durable goods 4.119 6.642 7.610 4.602 6.010 6.080
   non-durable goods 0.114 0.101 0.109 0.158 0.114 0.106
It is obvious from table 7 that the sudden surge of expenditure inequalities
in 1996 was caused basically by the temporary increase of inequalities of
expenditure on food, tobacco/alcohol/coffee, and housing construction/real
estate purchase. From these – as table 8 witnesses – food and housing con-
struction/real estate purchases have a particularly important role in deter-
mining the extent of such expenditure inequality. Working an effect con-
trary to the foregoing, the degree of inequality within expenditure on
transports, and housing accessories reflect a setback, while the weight of
transport expenditure in determining the inequality index also drops tem-
porarily. The reason for that is obviously the reduction of the inequality of
                                                
15 Define y = Σf y f  to be the decomposition of the variable y into factors, or, in our
particular case, the decomposition of expenditures into expenditure groups. We wish
to decompose the inequality index GE(2) for y as GE(2)=Σf Sf, and to generate from
that decomposition the coefficients sf = Sf /GE(2). Let σ  and σ f denote the variance of
y and yf, let ρ f denote the correlation coefficient between y és yf, and χ f the ratio of
the means of yf and y. Now, based on Shorrocks (1982) we claim the following: sf =
ρ f σ f / σ  = ρ f χ f √ (GEf(2)/GE(2)). Table 8 contains these sf coefficients in a percentage
form.19
expenditure on durables and, at the same time, the reduction of the share of
this type of expenditure (see the last two lines of tables 6, 7, and 8).
Table 8
The relative weight of expenditure groups in generating
the GE(2) index of total expenditure
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Food 13.8 15.3 14.5 18.8 15.6 13.7
Tobacco/alcohol/coffee 3.1 3.4 3.1 5.2 2.5 3.3
Clothing 8.5 6.8 5.9 6.3 7.1 7.7
Housing maintenance 4.2 4.4 5.5 5.8 7.7 8.9
Housing accessories 7.4 5.8 6.2 7.0 7.5 10.8
Health/fitness/cosmetics 2.3 2.7 2.9 4.7 5.3 6.9
Transports/Telecommunication 28.3 34.5 27.4 18.5 24.4 25.1
Culture/entertainment 7.1 6.8 8.9 10.7 9.3 11.4
Housing construction/real
estate purchase 21.1 15.9 20.2 17.6 11.5 2.6
Other expenditures 4.2 4.4 5.4 5.5 9.0 9.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
   durable goods 17.9 24.4 19.2 8.7 13.2 15.7
   non-durable goods 82.1 75.6 80.8 91.3 86.8 84.3
What is the ultimate reason for these phenomena? The austerity measures
in 1995 worked their full effect in the course of 1996 following the initial
shock: a 10% drop of income, inflation in excess of 20% for the second
consecutive year, and this year for the first time the price increase of dur-
ables exceeds that of foods, causing the consumer confidence index to
plummet.
From 1993 to 1995, and again in 1998, incomes in the Rotation Panel ex-
ceed expenditure, while in 1996 expenditures take the upper hand. This
clearly indicates the reduction of savings along with the mobilisation of
previously saved funds. The share of expenditure on durables drops, and
within that share the relatively expensive products undergo a lowering of
their purchase rate. A good example is that 1996 saw a considerable rise in
sales of commercially imported Western used passenger cars, compared to
1995, to come off the sales figures of new cars. This eventually resulted in
used cars outselling new cars on aggregate.
Instead of (or partly in addition to) purchasing durable items, those at the
top end of the income scale invested in housing or real estate, or continued
their previously undertaken construction of flats or summer resorts, while20
the less affluent could not afford doing that. This explains the increase in
inequality of expenditure on housing construction/real estate purchases.
The significant but temporary rise in inequality of expenditure on foods is
explained by the fact that those in the higher income brackets kept their
food expenditure level despite high inflation, while in the case of those in
the lower brackets and with reducing incomes even the share of food ex-
penditure shrank as their livelihood became so much harder that they were
confined to limit their food-bill in real value.
The transition of 1995-96 is missing from the panel, but we can analyse the
rearrangement of 1996-97. Real incomes in this period still showed a
downward tendency overall, while the real incomes of those belonging to
the first quintile increased significantly resulting in a more even income
landscape in 1997. This brought about a sudden rise of average food ex-
penditure of the poor, at a very low absolute figure until that time.
We can draw the following conclusion: an investigation of the trends of
inequalities of both incomes and expenditures reflects that the 1995 stabili-
sation shock was over by 1997 concerning the households’ incomes and ex-
penditures. The behaviour of inequalities make the fact likely that there are
persistent differences in income and expenditure positions.
4. MOBILITY OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES
The change of inequalities, and the social effect of that change are closely
related to the trends of relative income and expenditure positions. The
question is whether the gentle rise of income inequality between 1993-5
also meant rising inequality year on year between the same  groups of
households. Another question, no less important, is whether the stagnation
of income inequality in 1996-98 results from the fact that positions more or
less froze, and chances of the individual households to move higher on the
income/expenditure social ladder shrank to a minimum.
We experience every day that people find it hard to get over a situation
when they feel that their neighbours move past them in the income and even
more so on the consumption hierarchy. In an expanding economy, where
growth is an accessible aim for most households, the problem arises more
bluntly from the point of view of social mood. However, in an economy
shrinking for a longer period, growth, even if ever so small, becomes a neu-
ralgic point. The issue of relative mobility is made particularly acute in the21
Hungary of the 90s by the fact that the average household saw their real in-
comes significantly reducing.
Shorrocks (1978b) defines a measure of mobility and rigidity that relates to
inequality measures. The range of Shorrocks’ R is between 0 and 1, and the
higher value of the measure indicates higher rigidity (immobility) of ine-
qualities. It enables exclusively the comparison of rigidity in accordance to
a given variable of time intervals of identical length. Over a longer period,
including a shorter one, the value of the measure is necessarily lower. In
what follows (see table 9), we are going to investigate the changes in Shor-
rocks’ R of equalised income or expenditure, based on a variety of inequal-
ity measures. In the course of our computations we took account of those
persons only who were in the panel all through the period 1993-95, or 1996-
98.
Using the British Household Survey, Jarvis and Jenkins (1998) made the
same calculations for income rigidity. As a comparison we introduce some
of their results: for 1991-92 R(Gini) is 0.95, R(GE(2)) is 0.81, while for
1991-93 R(Gini) is 0.92 and R(GE(2)) is 0.73. The level of income rigidity
surprisingly is almost the same in the two countries, despite of the fact that
the British inequality measures (for 1991 Gini = 0.309, GE(2) = 0.198) are
much higher than the correspondent values in the Hungarian Rotation Panel.
Table 9
Shorrocks’ measure of rigidity
1993-94 1994-95 1993-95 1996-97 1997-98 1996-98
Income
R(Gini) 0.932 0.938 0.900 0.935 0.939 0.901
R(GE(-1)) 0.828 0.851 0.769 0.848 0.833 0.765
R(GE(2) 0.814 0.786 0.721 0.833 0.868 0.773
Expenditure
R(Gini) 0.929 0.928 0.891 0.949 0.944 0.919
R(GE(-1)) 0.854 0.846 0.781 0.888 0.885 0.834
R(GE(2) 0.797 0.787 0.714 0.834 0.816 0.749
Analysing the dynamics, table 9 provides no simple picture, and especially
not as regards incomes. On the basis of the GE(2) measure the mobility of
incomes was a little smaller in the years 1996-98 than in the initial period,
and the other two measures present virtually identical values in both cases.
In accordance with R(Gini) and especially with R(GE(-1)), the period
1993-94 had been more mobile than the two years of 1994-95, while22
R(GE(2)) suggests exactly the opposite. In the second panel-cycle, how-
ever, R(GE(-1)) indicates a situation contrary to the two other.
In respect of expenditure, the situation is more obvious: in accordance with
each index, the mobility of expenditure was higher in the first than in the
second three-year period. 1994-5 seems a little more mobile than 1993-94,
and 1997-8 seems more mobile than 1996-97, but differences are tiny in
both cases.
In sum, we can conclude that expenditure mobility in 1996-98 was lower
than in the three previous years, and there are very faint indications to sug-
gest that the same statement holds true for income mobility as well, and
what we experience there is rather just steady values. The various inequality
indices, and the mobility indices based on them, are more sensitive to ine-
quality experienced at different points of the income/expenditure scale. It
seems reasonable then, to apply a method similar to the transition matrices
when one investigates mobility.
16
Transition matrices, despite all theoretical problems,
17 are a proven tool of
investigating mobility among different social groups. Investigating income
mobility income deciles or quintiles constitute the social groups, and we
examine the chance of someone moving from one decile into another dur-
ing a given period.
A characteristic deficiency of this procedure from the point of view of in-
come/expenditure mobility is that it treats changes of very different dimen-
sions in the same way. It fails to note it as a change of position if someone
moves, e.g. from the bottom of quintile 1 to the top of the same, while it
regards it mobility if someone moves, as a result of however small a rise,
from the top of decile 1 to the bottom of decile 2.
Therefore, we adopt a different approach when examining mobility, and
look at the extent of relative changes of position. We establish a sequence of
the persons in the sample from the point of view of the variable under in-
vestigation, e.g. the equalised income, regarding also weighting. We associ-
ate the same serial numbers to persons with identical income, e.g. to mem-
                                                
16 We have also tried the method proposed in Fields and Ok (1998) that measures not
relative but absolute mobility. It is perhaps not irrelevant to mention that their
procedure cannot be so well used in cases where the change of average incomes is
really large from one period to the other as this will basically determine the size of
their mobility indicator. If, however, we apply the breakdown income movement =
social utility growth + social utility transfer in a way suggested by them, then the
social utility transfer thus obtained will be highest when the change of the average
income is the lowest, and the other way around.
17 See e.g. Shorrocks (1978a).23
bers of the same household. We finally normalise the sequence between 0
and 100%. We name the value thus received the relative position of the per-
son in question. We regard the person immobile at 10% range, if his/her
relative position in the period under scrutiny changed less than 10 percent-
age points. Consequently, we will regard such persons as 10% downwardly
or upwardly mobile if the change is equal or more than 10 percentage
points.
In what follows, we will examine the mobility of equalised in-
come/expenditure, and sometimes per one person, at 10 and 20% range, ex-
amining what percentage of the persons, who are in the sample in both the
initial and the closing year of the period in question, is mobile. Table 10
contains the 10 and 20%-range mobility of equalised income as a percent of
those belonging to the individual income quintiles, respectively.
Table 10
10%-range mobility of equalised income by income quintiles, %
1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
Quintile Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up
1 63 853 123 733 7
2 2 33 72 23 82 43 52 04 1
3 3 42 82 83 02 73 43 22 9
4 3 82 13 62 23 81 63 72 1
5 34 4 33 3 40 3 27 3
A v e r a g e 2 72 62 52 52 62 52 42 6
T o t a l 5 35 05 15 0
20%-range mobility of equalised income by income quintiles, %
1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
Quintile Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up
1 0 26 0 16 0 22 0 19
2 9 23 4 21 6 21 6 21
3 1 91 81 51 81 51 82 11 5
4 2 242 292 032 24
5 2 001 902 101 60
A v e r a g e 1 41 41 21 31 31 31 31 2
T o t a l 2 82 52 62 524
In the first panel cycle the average mobility of 10%-range drops from 53 to
50%. This is mainly the result of a major drop in the upward mobility of
those in the first quintile, from 38% in the 1993-94 transition to 31% in
1994-5. This second transition reflects the developments of the first year of
the stabilisation shock: a nearly 10% drop of the income goes together with
the decrease of the relative upward mobility of the poorest.
The 10%-range average mobility in the second panel cycle kept level at
50%. This stagnation is a phenomenon worth noting as the incomes began
to rise between 1997 and 1998, which as we can assume, did not imply the
intensification of mobility; mobility remained at its earlier level.
The stagnation is experienced also in respect of the poor as the mobility of
those in the first quintile did not change between the transitions of 1996-97
and 1997-98. However, it is a new phenomenon in this period that the
downward mobility of the richest sank significantly between 1996-97 and
1997-98. An increasing share of those with the highest incomes managed to
stabilise their positions.
If one looks at mobility at a 20% range (see second part of table 10), it will
reflect a decreasing share of mobile persons, but the tendency of changes
will be similar to what we have presented so far. At a 20% range, the de-
crease of the upward mobility of the poorest is a great deal more manifest.
Presenting the tendency of mobility not only for equalised but also for per
capita income promises interesting conclusions (table 11). In this case the
decrease of mobility is more intensive within both panel cycles, and it is
particularly obvious that between 1996-98 and 1997-98 – contrary to what
table 10 reflects – the upward mobility of the poorest greatly reduces. To
understand the phenomenon it is worthwhile making a short detour.
Table 11
10%-range mobility of per capita income by income quintiles, %
1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
Quintile Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up
13 3 643 04 3 4 5 2 7
22 2 3 72 02 81 8 3 5 1 6 4 1
33 8 2 62 53 43 0 3 2 3 2 2 3
43 6 2 23 41 93 7 1 8 3 1 2 0
5 37 5 33 5 31 0 28 3
Average 27 25 23 23 24 24 22 23
Total 52 46 48 4525
The divergence of the mobility of the two types of indicators originates
from the changed situation of those with large families i.e. mostly a couple
with 3-4 children. In the case of some of them a slight improvement of the
relative income position is perceptible between 1997 and 1998. This im-
provement remains below 10% in terms of per capita income, and thus it has
no bearing on mobility. However, in the case of equalised income, families
larger than the average can have their relative positions improved even at
smaller rises of their specific income.
The average number of children reflects a negative correlation with income
deciles not only in the case of per capita income – which is quite natural –
but also in the case of equalised income. This presents itself rather acutely at
the two extremes of the scale: the number of children in the first decile is
well above the average, while in the tenth it remains much below. In the pe-
riod 1993-95 the average child-number of households in the first equalised
income decile rises from 1.5 to 1.8 in 1993-95, then, in the period 1996-8,
primarily in 1998, this same value drops from 1.7 to 1.5.
Expenditure mobility exceeds corresponding income mobility every year
(table 12). This is quite understandable as dissavings, purchasing on credit,
or the other way around, beginning to save up prior to purchasing some
expensive item ensures more leeway in comparison to the income, in the
case of expenditure.
Table 12
10%-range mobility of equalised expenditure by expenditure quintiles, %
1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
Quintile Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up
1 43 733 553 33 3 2
2 2 14 32 04 21 93 82 3 4 1
3 3 63 23 63 52 83 23 2 3 5
4 3 72 34 02 34 02 54 0 2 3
54 634 123 523 3 1
A v e r a g e 2 92 82 82 72 52 62 6 2 7
T o t a l 5 75 55 1 5 3
The average expenditure mobility shows a downward trend in the period in
question, and rises only during the last transition, and even so, it remains
below the mobility indices of the first panel cycle. 1998 used to be the first
year in which household expenditure grew in real terms. It is still an open
issue if increasing mobility that year marks the beginning of a new trend or
is it merely normal fluctuation.26
Upward mobility of those in the first expenditure quintile gradually de-
creases, same as the downward mobility of those in the fifth quintile. This
latter process is particularly intensive. Rising average mobility in the last
year is obviously ascribable to the fact that mobility in both directions of
those in the second and third quintile increased. That witnesses growing un-
certainty of those ‘in the middle’, which may be pregnant with dangers as
well as opportunities.
Changes of relative position of income/expenditure from one year to the
other may be caused by numerous temporary phenomena. On the other
hand, immobile may be regarded those households that change their places
in small steps in the hierarchy. To filter out these phenomena, in table 13 we
present the share of those whose relative income/expenditure position re-
mained within the 10 or 20% neighbourhood of their initial position for
three years, respectively. So e.g. the difference of their relative income po-
sitions in 1994 and 1993, and in 1995 and 1993 remains likewise below
10%. We will continue to refer to them briefly as the long-term immobile
persons.
Table 13
The share of long-term immobile persons by income
and expenditure deciles, %
Equalised income Equalised expenditure
10%-range 20%-range 10%-range 20%-range
Decile 1993-95 1996-98 1993-95 1996-98 1993-95 1996-98 1993-95 1996-98
1 4 44 56 46 65 45 27 3 7 2
2 3 43 56 36 62 42 55 4 6 3
3 2 52 65 06 11 91 74 3 4 9
4 17 11 47 47 8 15 35 43
5 1 91 85 04 31 61 34 0 4 5
6 1 41 93 95 01 31 83 9 5 5
7 1 52 04 85 41 61 14 5 5 3
8 2 12 65 65 51 61 55 4 5 7
9 3 33 46 65 62 43 64 7 6 4
10 52 61 64 75 47 54 62 70
A v e r a g e 2 83 05 55 72 42 64 9 5 7
The share of the long-term immobile persons shows a gentle growth, except
for the 20% range expenditure mobility where that share rises significantly.
The income immobility of the poorest moves upward somewhat, but their27
expenditure immobility reduces slightly between the two periods. It is quite
conspicuous that in their case the expenditure immobility much exceeds the
income immobility. With those belonging to the second decile the expendi-
ture immobility grows also, especially at the 20% range.
Looking at the 20% range – except for the first decile – the share of the
long-term immobile follows an upward trend in the case of every decile.
This may lead us to assume that by the second part of the decade the time of
the major reshuffling was over. The group of the most affluent also seems to
close: in the case of those belonging to the tenth decile the share of the
long-term immobile significantly grows in each case presented.
Summing up the above, we can conclude that relative mobility decreased on
aggregate. The significant reduction in incomes experienced between 1993-
96 along with the gentle rise of the inequalities appeared simultaneously to
higher mobility. However, the beginning of the growth together with the
stagnation of inequalities resulted in sinking mobility, especially in the case
of the most affluent. There are certain indications that between 1997 and
1998 relative mobility rises among the poorest.
This last statement clearly calls for a supplement. So far we have been refer-
ring to relative mobility, but these processes took place beside decreasing
real incomes and expenditures. In other words, the poor in 1997 were much
poorer than those in 1993.
For the sake of comparability of relative and absolute changes let us select –
in an arbitrary fashion – the upper limit of the first quintile in 1993 as the
poverty line, and the upper limit of the first decile as the extra poverty line.
Table 14 shows the percentage of the population in later years for which it
was true that their income/expenditure in real terms remains below these
limits. In other words, we treat the 1993 relative poverty line as the absolute
poverty line in the other years.
To 1993 standards, in 1997 nearly half of the population could be said to be
poor. Considering the threshold for the 1993 extra poverty line then, the
situation was even worse because in 1996 three times as many persons
failed to reach that income level as in 1993. A similar situation prevails in
the case of expenditure, even though there the rise is somewhat more mod-
est.28
Table 14
The share of those below the poverty line and the extra poverty line, %
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Equalised income
Based on the first decile 10 12 21 30 29 28
Based on the first quintile 20 20 32 42 43 40
Equalised expenditure
Based on the first decile 10 12 16 21 21 22
Based on the first quintile 20 21 27 35 37 36
A particularly important issue is the share of the poor all through the inves-
tigated period. Between 1993 and 1995 just over 4% in terms of income are
steadily below the extra-poverty line, and 11% below the poverty line. This
means that over half of those belonging to the first quintile in 1993 could
not move above the line in any of those years. The situation is no different
with expenditures where the corresponding values are 5, and 10%, respec-
tively.
Between 1996 and 1998 we obtain much higher shares: 14% are perma-
nently below the extra poverty line, and 26% below the poverty line. So
between 1996 and 1998 there is a much higher share of those who have al-
ways been below the relevant poverty line than those whose income re-
mained below this line in 1993. As for expenditure, the corresponding
shares were 10, and 20%.
5. CHANGES IN THE HOUSEHOLD DURABLES
The question we are attempting to answer in this section is how the changes
that occurred in the income positions of the households modify their asset
positions. The available database does not allow us to examine either the
savings held in cash or in securities, or the value of their real estates. Hence,
the analysis of the stock of durables may be considered as a proxy for re-
viewing the asset positions of households.
The HBS database provides a limited means to measure household durables.
Since the share of those refused to answer was the highest among those liv-
ing in the best financial and material conditions, the real frequency of the
goods are somewhat underestimated. We do not have data concerning the
distribution of durables by age, either.29
The analysis of the number of durable goods held, however, has a great ad-
vantage over income or expenditure, namely that the families are willing to
declare their durable goods and remember clearly the circumstances of pur-
chase. Thus, the examination of the changes in durables is suitable for ana-
lysing the development of inequalities and mobility, for confirming or ques-
tioning our previous findings based on income and expenditure data.
For the purposes of defining the asset score, we used those 29 goods in the
survey that best characterise the stock and dynamics of the durables. In table
15 there are four frequency figures under the name of each item: the first
one is for 1993, the second (in brackets) for 1995, then for 1996 and 1998.
Non-availability of data means that the item was not yet included in the sur-
vey that year. The goods surveyed in both panel cycles are hereinafter re-
ferred to as comparative assets while those including all the goods in the ta-
ble are called total assets.
Table 15
The share of households with the 29 most typical durable goods, %
1993 (1995) 1996 1998 1993 (1995) 1996 1998 1993 (1995) 1996 1998
Refrigerator Freezer Refrigerator + freezer
97 (98) 85 85 59 (62) 54 60 – (–) 19 20
Gas/electric oven Gas and electric oven Microwave oven







57 (59) 52 50 46 (44) 51 55 – (–) 1 1
Vacuum cleaner Boiler/hot water Cleaning machine
89 (89) 90 91 82 (84) 87 88 – (–) 2 5
Black and white TV Colour TV Parabolic antenna
39 (33) 26 20 70 (78) 82 88 – (10) 15 17
Telephone line Mobile phone
26 (41) 50 71 – (1) 3 7
Bicycle Motorbike Car
63 (63) 65 63 10 (5) 10 8 33 (34) 36 34
Radio/with cassette Stereo radio HI-FI SET
84 (85) 86 88 32 (33) 32 33 13 (12) 19 21
Camera VCR Video camera
45 (42) 47 49 33 (34) 43 44 0 (1) 2 2
Record player CD player PC
20 (18) 16 16 – ( – ) 4 9 6 (6) 8 930
The frequency of the goods essential for satisfying basic needs generally in-
creased while the frequency of outdated items decreased during the six years
under review. The number of automatic washing machines definitely grew
in the period as well as the number of colour televisions, boilers and videos.
There was a boom in the number of telephone lines
18, while the frequency of
cars stayed unchanged.
The aggregate measure of assets is generated by assigning a quality score to
the goods held by the households. In our calculations, we assigned 1 to the
goods in the first column, 3 in the middle and 5 in the third column of table
15, except for cars that scored 15. That also means that we considered the
different needs equal and there is no difference between their scores, while
the up-to-dateness of goods is classified by this simple scoring system. The
total score of the goods gives the score of the stock of durables, hereinafter
the asset score. When calculating the asset scores, we noted cases where
there was more than one of the given item in the household.
The difference between asset scores at two different points in time reflects
the change in the total score of goods from one period to the other. Its posi-
tive or negative value is the simplest measure of enrichment or impoverish-
ment. For the period 1996-98, we computed both the comparative scores
with the first panel cycle and the scores of the total assets. When generating
the comparative scores, we took into account that certain goods were previ-
ously grouped differently (e.g. combined refrigerator-freezers were classi-
fied as refrigerators before 1996).
The categories of household groups we introduced for the purpose of the
analysis of durables  take into account the changes in real income and ex-
penditure. Table 16 shows the changes in time of real income and expendi-
ture. There was a fall in real income in more than 50% of the population in
the periods 1993-1994 as well as 1994-1995 and also in the first transition
of the second cycle, between 1996 and 1997. The downturn in real income
affected the largest number of people between 1994 and 1995. In that pe-
riod, the real income of almost three quarters of the population decreased: to
a large extent for 31% and to a lesser extent for another 43%. An improve-
ment occurred only at the end of the second panel cycle in 1997-98, when
the real income of 58% of the population increased.
                                                
18 This rate of increase of supply of land-line telephones is not explained by a change in
consumers’ behaviour. Prior to the political changes the telephones were a typical
shortage-item. The privatisation followed by a rapid upgrade of the network created
the conditions of the expanding telephone service.31
Table 16
Distribution of households by changes in real income
and expenditure, %
1
st panel cycle 2
nd panel cycle Changes in
real income 1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
–  – 1 83 11 71 3
– 3 34 33 62 9
+ 2 81 62 83 5
+  + 2 11 01 92 3
Total 100 100 100 100
1
st panel cycle 2
nd panel cycle Changes in
real expen-
diture 1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
–  – 2 33 12 21 9
– 2 83 23 32 8
+ 2 41 92 62 7
+  + 2 51 81 92 6
Total 100 100 100 100
Key:  – – : real income/expenditure of the final year is less than
80% of the starting year real income and real expendi-
ture, resp.
– : between 80 and 100%,
+  : between 100 and 120%,
+ + : exceeds 120% of the respective value.
We observed a similar tendency for the changes in time of real expenditure.
Between 1994 and 1995, the real expenditure of 31% of the households
radically shrank, while 63% of the households decreased their real expen-
diture. Even in the period between 1996 and 1997, the fall in real expendi-
ture continued in 55% of the households. It occurred only during the transi-
tion of 1997-1998 that more than half of the population were able to in-
crease their real spending.
We would expect that the majority of households limit their expenditure on
durable consumer goods and spend only on basic and necessary items dur-
ing inflation when there is a permanent fall in the real income and real ex-
penditure and the asset scores of average households stagnate. However, the
total asset score of households increased in the 1993-94-period, then in32
1994-5 there was a significant drop, while during the 1996-97 transition the
score turned positive again (see table 17).
Before 1995 the worsening economic conditions generated pessimistic ex-
pectations in the majority of households. This, together with the relatively
low inflation on the durables market, caused that in 1994 the households
spent more on durable consumer goods then in 1993. In 1994-5, however,
the reaction of the majority of households was just the opposite: even if
their real expenditures increased, they let the level of their household assets
decrease and postponed their purchases of durables. In this period, even the
households, increased their real expenditure to the greatest extent, reduced
their stock of durables.
Following the low in 1996, consumer reactions of 1996-97 were similar to
those observed in 1993-94. Although the real income and real expenditure
of the majority of households still fell, the asset score differences were
mostly positive. Postponed purchases were now realised.
Between 1997 and 1998 such a common reaction of the households was no
longer observable. Although real income and real expenditure increased in
the majority of households, total asset scores increased at a lesser degree
than in the previous year. The asset scores of the households that reduced
their real spending at a significant rate definitely decreased. They were not
able to replace discarded goods or, what is worse, they were forced to sell
their goods in order to supplement their lower income.
Between 1997 and 1998, approximately one third of the households that suf-
fered severe decrease in real income reacted by cutting back their real ex-
penditure while their stock of durables decreased from one year to the other.
If we examine the changes in time in asset score differences by the catego-
ries of changes in real expenditure, we can see that the score of assets grew
simultaneously with increasing real expenditure. The values in table 17
suggest a close connection between the increase in real expenditure and the
positive changes in asset scores. If, however, we analyse the changes in as-
set score differences by the categories of changes in real income, the ten-
dencies are less clear-cut: there is no direct relationship between the
changes in real income and the growth in stock of durables.
The analysis of table 17 may raise doubts in the reader that the changes in
time of asset score differences are due to the occurrence or lack of only the
car. In order to avoid it, we also calculated the asset scores except cars. The
changes in time of asset score differences showed exactly the same trend.33
Table 17
The changes in asset scores by real income
and expenditure change categories
1
st panel cycle 2
nd panel cycle Changes in
real income 1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
– – 1.8 -1.3 -0.2 0.7
– 1.6 -1.3 1.6 0.1
+ 2.3 -1.0 2.1 0.7
+ + 4.0 -0.9 1.7 0.9
Total 2.3 -1.2 1.5 0.5
1
st panel cycle 2
nd panel cycle Changes in
real expen-
diture 1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
– – 0.5 -2.7 0.4 -2.6
– 1.7 -0.8 1.0 -0.3
+ 2.7 -0.3 1.8 1.7
+ + 4.3 -0.2 2.9 2.6
Total 2.3 -1.2 1.5 0.5
See key for previous table.
We can also use the asset scores to examine the inequalities of stock of dur-
ables. Similarly to table 4, we calculated the Gini coefficient and the Gener-
alised Entropy index for -1 and 2 parameter values. Table 18 contains the
inequality indices for both the comparative and the total assets.
The series of Gini coefficient reflects a slow but permanent decrease for the
full period. The GE indices show a slight fluctuation during the first panel
cycle. The GE(-1) index temporarily grows in 1994. This measure is rela-
tively more sensitive to lower values and its growth may be due to the fact
that the positions of those with lower asset scores was worse than the aver-
age positions during that period. The GE(2) index, that is more sensitive to
higher values, grew temporarily in 1995 when income inequalities were also
relatively high. With regard to total assets however, where scores include
newer, somewhat more modern equipment, the rate of decrease in inequality
indices is lower than that of the comparative scores.34
Table 18
Inequality indices calculated for the asset scores
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Comparative household durables
Gini 0.309 0.304 0.302 0.296 0.293 0.282
GE(-1) 0.254 0.264 0.242 0.237 0.223 0.208
GE(2) 0.150 0.142 0.152 0.138 0.134 0.123
Total household durables
Gini 0.302 0.298 0.295
GE(-1) 0.252 0.235 0.231
GE(2) 0.144 0.139 0.137
We examined the development of differences in asset scores from another
aspect as well. For that we have to refer back to table 13 that presents the
permanently immobile households with regard to expenditure. We have
generated the quotient of the asset scores of those permanently immobile
around decile 10 and around decile 1 for both panel cycles. In case of a 10%
mobility range, this quotient grew from 3.6 to 4.2 between 1993 and 1995
then dropped from 4.4 to 4.1 between 1996 and 1998.
The stock of durables changes more slowly than the income or expenditure,
and savings do not manifest solely in the household durables. Taking into
account all these aspects, we can establish that our computations concern-
ing the inequalities of stock of durables confirm our previous findings: in
the second panel cycle investigated, the growth of income inequalities
halted and inequalities stabilised.
The development of income and expenditure inequalities as well as stock of
durables inequalities are strongly related to the trends of asset positions. For
the asset scores, our interpretation of the degree of relative changes in posi-
tions is similar to the interpretation regarding income and expenditure in the
previous section.
The 10%-range mobility of household durables fall from 37 to 34% in the
first panel cycle (see table 19). It was primarily due to the decreased upward
mobility of those significantly increasing their real income and real expen-
diture. In the second panel cycle, the average of the 10%-range mobility of
durables slightly decreased, then stagnated, despite the growth in real in-
come and real expenditure that started between 1997 and 1998. So the in-
crease in income and expenditure was not accompanied by a more vigorous
mobility of stock of durables. The upward mobility of those with signifi-
cantly increasing real income and real expenditure did not grow, and their35
downward mobility did not fall either. These people managed to stabilise
their asset positions.
Table 19
10%-range mobility of comparative assets
 by real income categories, %
1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
Category Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up
–  –1 91 42 01 91 81 12 01 9
– 2 21 51 51 51 41 51 71 3
+ 1 51 71 51 61 31 91 11 2
+  +1 82 71 92 21 61 81 61 8
A v e r a g e 1 91 81 71 71 51 61 51 4
T o t a l 3 73 43 12 9
10%-range mobility of comparative assets
 by real expenditure categories, %
1993-94 1994-95 1996-97 1997-98
Category Down Up Down Up Down Up Down Up
– – 22 9 21 14 20 15 25 7
– 2 01 61 61 81 61 42 01 2
+ 1 51 81 32 11 21 5 81 5
+  +1 72 71 51 91 02 11 12 2
A v e r a g e 1 91 81 71 71 51 61 51 4
T o t a l 3 73 43 12 9
However, the upward mobility of those, who suffered a reduction of real in-
come and real expenditure, fell significantly between 1997 and 1998. Dur-
ing 1996-97 upward mobility of those who suffered a reduction in real ex-
penditure was around 30% while, in 1997-98, was around 20%.
We can establish that the mobility of stock of durables definitely decreased
during the periods under review. The fall in the income and expenditure and
the continuos decrease in asset inequalities experienced between 1993 and
1996 were coupled with relatively high mobility. The commencement of
growth and the further decrease in the inequalities of assets were accompa-
nied with reduced asset mobility, particularly with those coping with a sig-
nificant downturn in real expenditure. The relationship between inequalities
and mobility, however, fastens asset positions which renders some house-
holds unable to improve their positions on the short term. Hence the short36
term income and expenditure shocks occurring in 1995 and 1996 had a
multiplier effect on the long term. In spite of lower inequalities in household
durables, the freeze of positions may increase the sense of inequality and
may, later on, when inequalities slightly increase, suggest a higher degree
of inequality and may even create frustration.
6. SUMMARY
Between 1996-98 the inequalities of the income and expenditure and the
stock of durables of the Hungarian households did not increase any further
but rather stabilised. Different inequality indices show a slight increase in
inequalities between 1993 and 1996, and the comparison of them suggests
that the inequalities grew at the ends of the scale only. This process also
stopped between 1996 and 1998. The increase in the ratio of income per-
centiles 90 and 10 between 1993 and 1996 was due to fact that the families
suffering from long-term unemployment fell further behind.
The level of expenditure inequalities is significantly higher than the level of in-
come inequalities. Due to the 1995 stabilisation, the expenditure inequalities
temporarily peaked in 1996. The decomposition of expenditure inequalities en-
abled us to analyse accurately the reshuffling process of inequalities stating that
the shock caused by the 1995 stabilisation measures ceased by 1997 at the level
of income and expenditure of households. The decrease in the inequalities of
stock of durables is more clear-cut than that of the income inequalities, which
in fact presents a further confirmation of our findings.
The stagnation of inequalities is coupled with decreasing mobility, which
may also account for the stabilisation of inequalities. This process may be
observed in every income and expenditure decile. Immobility is particularly
strong at the ends of the income and expenditure scales. The poor have less
chance to improve their positions, and even the commencement of economic
growth failed to increase their mobility. Further analysis is required to de-
termine whether or not a longer term growth can increase the upward mo-
bility of the poor. It is obvious that the richest families were able to stabilise
their positions permanently.
With relatively low and decreasing mobility measures, we cannot expect a
decrease in inequalities in the future. Hence this process may result in the
stabilisation of the income/expenditure and the asset positions of the house-
holds. Our results suggest that while there was a general and accelerating
restructuring of the income and expenditure of households in the early phase
of the transition, this process slowed down during the period under review
and was coming to a halt at the end of the 1990s.37
APPENDIX
A.1. MOST IMPORTANT FEATURES OF THE SURVEY AND OF THE SAMPLES
The Household Budget Surveys (HBS) of the Central Statistical Office
look back on a past of over 50 years. Such surveys had been conducted an-
nually up to 1983, from that year until 1993 in every odd year, and from
1993 they are prepared again on an annual basis. First we describe some
important features of the full sample of HBS
19. The basic population of the
survey is the entirety of the Hungarian citizens living in households in
Hungary, i.e. the survey does not cover those in so-called institutional
households. The basic unit of our selection is the flat, that of our observa-
tion the household. (This entails that the temporal follow-up of demo-
graphic processes of the households is only possible in the case of those
who stayed in the same flat.)
One twelfth of households participating in the survey maintain a household
accounts record for one month each, this is followed by an interview con-
cerning the whole year at the end of the year, and two more interviews
with each household in the survey in the first quarter of the following year.
The final database will have the 12-fold of the values obtained from the
monthly records on food, tobacco/alcohol/coffee, and part of clothing,
while the rest of the expenditures as well as incomes come from the annual
interview.
The sampling districts are selected in a one or two-tier process depending
on the size of the settlement, and all settlements with a population in ex-
cess of 15,000 are integrated in the survey. At the same time, the number
of settlements in the survey has been seriously reduced since 1996 for fi-
nancial reasons.
The master sample is not proportional thus the master sample/population
quotient in Budapest is half, and in settlements larger than 50,000, 3/5 of
that employed in small settlements. This is explained by the fact that –
following a tradition of several decades – the population of Budapest and
the large cities had been assumed to be more homogenous than that of
small settlements. This massive routine only changed in 1998, and proved
to be a hindrance already in the 90s as refusals to respond or alternative
                                                
19 In preparing that we have relied on the methodological sections of the CSO’s
publications titled Household Budget Survey as well as on CSO (1997). For an Eng-
lish description of the sampling technique see Mihályffy (1994)38
reasons for inconclusive interviews reached outstanding rates in Budapest.
Successful interviews oscillated around 60% in the entire period, while
those in Budapest were only in the ballpark on 1/3. A result of that, already
in the original (non-panel) sample, the share of the capital city is no more
than 7-8%, where in fact 18-19% of the country’s population live.
As regards the reliability of HBS data one needs to state first of all that
they fail to take account of the data of some marginalised social groups
such as the homeless, the poorest unable or unwilling to communicate with
the interviewer, or data of the most affluent living in separation from soci-
ety. These internationally known characteristic features become a problem
upon the appearance of sudden and significant social changes.
The introduction of personal income taxation, the expansion of the infor-
mal or the black economy, economic/social changes, the differentiation of
incomes and of people’s property status, the appearance of entrepreneurial
lifestyles, and the deterioration public safety compromised the quality of
the outcome of the HBS and of the willingness to respond as regards both
the concealment of income items, or occasionally some expenditure items.
Further deterioration of quality came through the fact that households un-
dertaking to maintain account records lose momentum over the years.
Those refusing to respond are mainly the those in the higher income
deciles, those with higher schooling, entrepreneurs, and city dwellers, par-
ticularly residents of the capital city.
All these phenomena have gathered considerable significance in the panel,
and have been much intensified by the rotation of the participants in the
period 1996-8, and the deficiencies through the replacement of participants
selected in the panel but replaced for lack of willingness to respond. This
is why between 1996 and 1998 only about one quarter of the original 1996
sample entered the panel instead of the theoretical one third. On the whole,
the 1993-95 panel contains 3,507 households, and the 1996-8 panel 1,863,
which is 1, and 0.5 per thousand of all households, respectively. In the
course of generating the panel, we regarded identical those which had at
least one permanent member.
It is worthwhile comparing the panel sample with actual data in a few im-
portant respects. We would like to highlight those with particular signifi-
cance from the point of view weighting: features concerning age, sex, re-
gion, schooling, activity, and type of household. We present the compara-
tive data for the first years of the panel cycles (i.e. for the periods 1993-95
and 1996-98).39
Table A.1
Ratios of the panel sample and fact figures compared to




Men Women Total Men Women Total
0-19 92 96 94 102 107 105
20-34 75 84 80 78 84 81
35-54 92 101 96 91 100 96
55-X 125 127 126 111 119 116
Total 96 104 100 95 104 100
Source of fact figures: CSO Demographic Yearbooks, adjusted by the expert estimate
concerning institutional residents, prepared by CSO staff.
As regards age, the most important phenomenon is the significant underrep-
resentation in the sample of young adults and overrepresentation of those
beyond retirement age. Women are slightly overrepresented (see table A.1).
The most serious difficulty with the sample is the underrepresentation of
Budapest and – to a smaller extent – of the other major cities 
20 (see table
A.2). Thus for instance in the period 1993-95 the representation of the
capital city in the sample is no more than one seventh of the corresponding
figure of those not living in major cities. This issue is particularly mean-
ingful for our subject as in the unweighted panel sample, in the period
1993-95 the average income of Budapest residents exceeded those in other
settlements by 13-16%, while that of residents of major cities only by 7-
9%. The same situation is shown even more conspicuously in the 1996-98
panel where the relevant ratios move around 20% and 15% p.a. In the case
of per capita expenditures the same differences are even greater.
Table A.2 points at the overrepresentation of pensioners and unemployed
persons and at the underrepresentation of active earners. A particular
problem is the very low number of entrepreneurs in the sample.
                                                
20 Major city is meant to refer to the county seats and non-county seats but having a
population in excess of 50,000, totaling 22 settlements.40
Table A.2
Ratios of the panel sample and fact figures compared to the average




















51 9 6 540 16 30 60 43
Active earners
total 13 50 115 78 22 55 110 80
Pensioner 32 74 169 123 43 76 150 116




22 62 133 102 31 62 127 101
Pupil 21 55 146 98 30 65 157 112
Child not at-
tending school 17 56 123 91 25 53 127 96
Total 21 59 141 100 30 63 133 100
Source of fact figures: microcensus of 1996, and computations of Mária Keszthelyi-
Rédei (CSO) based on the extrapolated data of the 1990 census, data of labour force
surveys of various years, and of the address checks conducted by the CSO.
Incomes and expenditures are closely related to the highest schooling
range of the active earners in the household, data also strongly differenti-
ated according to settlement types. This is why the facts presented in table
A.3, chiefly the major underrepresentation of higher education graduates in
the sample are of particular significance to us. This was mainly character-
istic for residents of Budapest and other major cities in the initial period,
while in the second the same phenomenon came to characterise residents
of other settlements as well. A feature characterising both cycles is that the
highest willingness to respond in Budapest and the major cities was char-
acteristic of residents with secondary schooling, while in other settlements
the same is seen among those with only primary education.41
Table A.3
Ratios of the panel sample and fact figures per type of settlement,
























Primary 87 102 105 114 92 93 108 116
Secondary 134 111 91 90 128 119 91 92
Tertiary 71 75 92 66 71 84 76 62
Active ear-
ners total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
* Primary education: 8 years of primary education or less, vocational school; secondary:
GCSE holders; tertiary: holders of a college or university degree.
Source of fact data: for 1996 the data of the 1996 microcensus; for 1993, regarding the
total column above, the data of the 1993 statistical yearbook; for internal distribution
our own computations based on the data of the 1990 census, the 1996 microcensus, and
the 1992, and 1994 wage tariff survey.
F.2. Calibrating the data
Due to the above presented problems of the database, the calibration proc-
ess and the selection of the appropriate control variables proved to be an
especially sensitive task. In selecting the calibration procedure, our basic
point of view was to see that it suits the practice of the CSO to date and the
one under transformation, i.e. the calibration procedure of the original
HBS sample.
21
Since 1993, the CSO has been using the generalised iterative scaling proc-
ess to calibrate databases of household statistics (see Darroch and Ratcliff
(1972)).
One of the most important advantages of the procedure is that it preserves
the feature of design-based weights whereby all members of the individual
                                                
21 We would like to thank hereby László Mihályffy for the invaluable information he
shared with us concerning calibration, and Mária Keszthelyi-Rédei for her assistance
in specifying the value of the control variables. For written information on the
calibration procedure applied in the course of the HBS see the English Appendix of
the CSO Household Budget Survey, 1999.42
households are of the same weight. A further advantage is that it ensures,
by definition, the non-negativity of weights, and provides a way of keeping
them within reasonable limits. The procedure solves the following problem:
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and the optional constrains
u w l j ≤ ≤ ,  j = 1, 2, … , n                                                       (3), where
−   n denotes the number of households in the sample;
−  
0
j w  and wj  are the original design-based, and the calibrated weights, resp.;
−   qij  is the value of the i-th control variable in the j-th household;
−   ci is the value of the i-th control variable in the entire population;
−   l and u are the lower and the upper limits, respectively, for calibrated
weights.
We have used the following control variables in the course of the calibration process:
1.  4 age groups in a breakdown by sex, for 7 regions of Hungary (NUTS
range II) (a total of 56 variables). The 4 age groups are as follows: 0-
19, 20-34, 35-54, and 55-X (see table A.1).
2.  Active earners with primary, secondary and tertiary education, in a
breakdown by Budapest – major cities – other settlements (table A.3)
3.  Total population of Budapest, the major cities, and other settlements.
4.  Number of entrepreneurs, pensioners, those on child nursing benefit,
pupils/students, and children not attending school without a regional
breakdown (see table A.2).
5.  Number of households, one-person households and households with
children similarly without a regional breakdown.
Our original plan was to carry out the calibration in a breakdown by Buda-
pest – major cities – other settlements, but the small size of the Budapest
sample unfortunately prevented this exercise.
We note at this point in conjunction with the 4
th group of variables that it
implicitly contains – together with the 2
nd group – employees as well be-
cause active earners consist of these and of entrepreneurs.
In respect to the specification of control variables, we still need to address
the problems of the unemployed. A household-statistics survey regards un-
employed those persons who pursue no activity to serve as their main
source of income, and who, in response to the question on the type of their
inactivity, select the answer ‘seeking work’. It becomes obvious from the43
microanalysis of the data that, from the point of view of actual unemploy-
ment, this latter group is hard to separate from those who selected the an-
swers ‘managing a household’, or, especially, ‘does not wish to work’ A
further difficulty is that macro-range data on unemployment are hard to
bring in line with these categories. Thus we have found that the most rea-
sonable solution is to treat the unemployed and other dependants as one
category from the point of view calibration.
We did the calibration for the first year of the cycle for both periods, and
we applied the weights thus obtained for the two subsequent years as well.
As lower and upper limits for the 1993-95 period we used the values 400
and 12,000, and in the 1996-98 period (whose sample was significantly
smaller) 650 and 13,000. The point of setting limits was to possibly reduce
the relative difference of the weights. Lowering the upper limit resulted in
the fact that tasks (1)-(3) presented above had no solution. The lower limit
could have been raised, but it would have implied a considerably greater
error and distortion in the estimation of income deciles.
By way of comparison we note that the original sample weights of the
panel in 1993 come within the 204-6,440 bracket, and in 1996 in the 501-
10,309 one. The calibrated weights of the full HBS sample in 1993 were
between 72 and 3,932, and in 1996 between 121 and 2,186. This means
that in the case of the calibrated weights we have managed to keep the ra-
tio of the highest and the lowest values of the design-based weights.
Table A.4. contains calibrated data referring to errors and distortions of in-
come deciles computed with calibrated data, obtained with by applying the
bootstrap method. We provide the values for 1998 as these are the worst.
Table A.4







95% bias corrected confi-
dence interval (in 1000 HUF)
 Decile 1 162 3.0 -16 153 170
 Decile 2 196 2.6 0 186 206
 Decile 3 226 2.3 1 216 235
 Decile 4 252 2.5 26 242 266
 Decile 5 282 1.8 27 274 294
 Decile 6 310 1.4 6 302 322
 Decile 7 345 2.1 18 331 361
 Decile 8 398 2.3 4 382 415
 Decile 9 476 4.0 24 452 51644
We have done the computations with the STATA 6.0 software, applying 3000
replications.
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